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19561

SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -

1955

criminal court in any county is a self-executing right of Article IV, section
3 of the constitution; the legislature cannot deprive the judge of this authority.21 However, the initiative and referendum authority for noncharter cities provided in section 1 of Article H is not self-executing but
executory only; the General Assembly can legislate to provide a maximum
A petition filed after
thirty-day filing period for a referendum petition.
2
the thirty-day period is invalid under the statute.1
The unusual Ohio rule on holding a state statute unconstitutional found
in Article IV, section 2 No law shall he held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the
affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void,

came into operation in 1955. A state appropriation to certain veterans'
organizations for the rehabilitation of war veterans and for promotion of
patriotism was attacked as violating Art. VII, section 4 which prohibits
the giving or lending of state credit to any individual, association or corporation. The money was released only when a semi-annual expenditure
report was filed with the state controlling board. The court of appeals
had held this statute constitutional. Two or more of the Supreme Court
judges had doubts concerning its unconstitutionality; hence the statute was
held valid.2 s
OWER SCHROEDER, JR.

CONTRACTS
Retraction of Repudiation of Contract Impossible
After Suit by Promisee
The Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, in Gilmore v. American Gas Machine Co.,' held that where a party bound by an executory contract repudiates his obligations before the time for performance, the
promisee, so far as further performance is concerned, may treat the contract as ended, and maintain an action at once for damage occasioned by
such anticipatory breach and that this rule applies where a repudiation
occurs during performance. The court also held that once the promisee
has brought suit for the anticipatory breach, an attempt to retract the
repudiation is ineffectual.
t
State v. Powers, 129 N.E2d 653 (Ohio App. 1954).
'Dubyak v. Kovach, 164 Ohio St. 247, 129 N.E.2d 809 (1955).
1 State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955).
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Waiver of Condition Precedent in Construction Contract
In Creith Lumber Co. *v.Cumminins' a contractor had coitracted to furnish the niaterials and build a house on the land of the contractee. By the
terms of the contract the unpaid balance of the contract price was not to
become due and payable until there had been issued by a mortgage lender
employed by the contractee to finafice the building project an approval
certificate as to the construction of the house. The contractor substantially
performed the c6ntract, and the contrctee took possession and occupied
the house as his property. Upon the contractee's failure to pay the balance
of the contract price, the contractor brought suit against the contractee to
recover such balance although the approval certificate called for by the
contract had not been issued by the mortgage lender. The common pleas
court granted the contractee's motion for dismissal. The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment. In reversing the judgment and remanding the
case to the -trial court, the Supreme Court ruled -that although the approval
certificate constituted a condition precedent to the maintenance of an
action to recover the balance claimed to be due, where the owner of a
building built for him under a contract substantially performed accepts and
takes possession, knowing or having reason to know that the construction
is defective or incomplete, such acceptance will be deemed a waiver of such
a condition precedent and the contractor will be entitled to recover the
amount due under the contract, less deductions for deficiencies.

Cost Plus Fixed Fee Contract
The Supreme Court held in Charles A. Burton, Inc. v. Durkee,3 which
was an action to recover compensation by a building contractor on a cost
plus fixed fee contract, that where the defendant for whom the structure
was built asserts a counter claim for compensable damages which he claims
to have suffered by reason of malfeasance, extravagance, wastefulness, and
negligence on the builder's part, the burden of proof is upon the defendant
to establish his claims of damage, and, even though there is a marked disparity between the builder's estimation of the cost and the actual cost of
the structure, the builder is not bound to show that the costs were reasonable.
Employment Contract - Restrictive Covenant
In Toulmin v. Becker,4 an employment contract which provided that
the employee could not, in the event of termination of his employment:
'129 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio Com. P1. 1952).
2163 Ohio St. 264, 126 N.E.2d 323 (1955).
'162 Ohio St. 433, 123 N.E.2d 432 (1954).
'124 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio App. 1954).

